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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JACOB A. WEBB, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20061109-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from a conviction on one count of 
burglary, a third degree felony (R. 105-06). This Court has 
jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2) (e) (West 2004) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
Did the trial court correctly sentence defendant for felony 
burglary rather than misdemeanor burglary of a vehicle where 
defendant admitted to breaking into and stealing multiple items 
from two camping trailers, which the trial court properly 
categorized as "buildings" within the meaning of the burglary 
statute? 
A sentence will not be overturned on appeal unless the trial 
court has abused its discretion, failed to consider all legally 
relevant factors, or imposed a sentence that exceeds legally 
prescribed limits. State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 
1989)(citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004), governing burglary, 
provides: 
(1) An actor is guilty of burglary if he 
enters or remains unlawfully in a building or 
any portion of a building with intent to 
commit: 
(b) theft[.] 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree 
unless it was committed in a dwelling, in 
which event it is a felony of the second 
degree. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (West 2004), governing definitions 
applicable to burglary and criminal trespass, provides: 
For purposes of this part: 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary 
meaning, means any watercraft, aircraft, 
trailer, sleeping car, or other structure or 
vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation 
of persons or for carrying on business 
therein . . . . 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is 
usually occupied by a person lodging therein 
at night, whether or not a person is actually 
present. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-204 (West 2004), governing burglary of 
a vehicle, provides: 
(1) Any person who unlawfully enters any 
vehicle with intent to commit a felony or 
theft is guilty of burglary of a vehicle. 
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(2) Burglary of a vehicle is a class A 
misdemeanor. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with one count each of burglary, a 
third degree felony, and theft, a class A misdemeanor (R. 1). 
After a preliminary hearing, defendant filed a motion to quash 
the bindover, which the trial court denied (R. 31-30, 137: 5). 
Thereafter, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to one 
count of burglary and the court dismissed the theft charge. (R. 
87-96). The court sentenced defendant to a suspended zero-to-
five-year prison term, 180 days in jail with credit for time 
served, a fine of $800, restitution of $1065, and a panoply of 
probation conditions (R. 105-06, R. 140: 5-6). Defendant filed a 
timely appeal (R. 115). 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
Defendant admitted to breaking into two camping trailers 
parked in Pole Canyon in October 2005 and taking a variety of 
items from the trailers, including a distinctive hooded 
sweatshirt, a hunting vest, a deer print blanket, camp chairs, a 
gun cleaning kit, and nine boxes of ammunition (R. 52-54). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendant contends that where he admitted to breaking into 
and stealing property from two camping trailers, the State could 
have charged him with either felony burglary or misdemeanor 
burglary of a vehicle. Defendant bases this argument on the 
premise that a camping trailer is a vehicle as a matter of law. 
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Relying on State v. Shondel, he concludes that, because he could 
have been charged with either offense, the trial court erred by 
sentencing him for the greater of the two crimes. 
Defendant's argument fails for two reasons. First, the 
definition he cites for "camping trailer" comes from a section of 
the Code governing automobile franchises, wholly irrelevant here. 
The relevant definition appears in the part of the Code governing 
burglary and criminal trespass. The applicable statute clearly 
defines a "trailer . . . or other structure or vehicle adapted 
for overnight accommodations of persons" as a "building." Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-6-201(1). Defense counsel conceded the camping 
trailer "was equipped with a sleeping area" (R. 137: 3). The 
trailer, therefore, is plainly a "building" within the meaning of 
the burglary statute. 
Second, the Shondel doctrine does not apply because burglary 
and vehicle burglary do not describe the same crime. An 
additional element—adaptation for overnight accommodation-
distinguishes felony burglary from misdemeanor burglary of a 
vehicle. Thus, for burglary, the State had to prove the 
additional element that the crime occurred in a "trailer. . . or 
other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of 
persons." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201(1). There is no such 
requirement for vehicle burglary. Because the statutory elements 
of the two crimes are not "wholly duplicative," the Shondel 
doctrine is inapplicable. 
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ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY SENTENCED 
DEFENDANT FOR FELONY BURGLARY 
RATHER THAN MISDEMEANOR BURGLARY OF 
A VEHICLE WHERE DEFENDANT ADMITTED 
TO BREAKING INTO AND STEALING 
MULTIPLE ITEMS FROM TWO CAMPING 
TRAILERS, WHICH THE COURT PROPERLY 
CATEGORIZED AS "BUILDINGS" FOR 
PURPOSES OF THE BURGLARY STATUTE 
Defendant admitted to stealing property from two camping 
trailers (R. 87-96). Because a camping trailer is a "vehicle" as 
a matter of law, he argues that the State could have charged him 
with either felony burglary or misdemeanor burglary of a vehicle. 
Thus, despite his conviction for felony burglary, defendant 
contends that he is entitled to the punishment applicable to 
misdemeanor burglary of a vehicle. See Br. of Aplt. at 6-8, 9, 
11-12. For this argument, he relies on State v. Shondel, 453 
P.2d 146 (Utah 1969). 
Defendant's argument fails for two related reasons. First, 
he premises it on the incorrect notion that a camping trailer is 
a "vehicle" as a matter of law. To support this argument, 
defendant extracts definitions from Title 13 (Commerce and 
Trade), chapter 14 (New Automobile Franchise Act), a part of the 
Utah Code governing the relationship between the State, 
franchised car dealerships, and the public. See Utah Code Ann. § 
13-14-101 (West 2004)(outlining legislative purpose of Act); Br. 
of Aplt. at 6-7. Notably, the limiting phrase, "[a]s used in 
this chapter" precedes the definitional section on which 
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defendant relies. See Utah Code Ann. § 13-14-102 (West 2004). 
The definitions cited by defendant thus expressly relate only to 
automobile franchises, which are plainly not at issue here. 
The statute governing burglary provides that "[a]n actor is 
guilty of burglary if he enters or remains unlawfully in a 
building or any portion of a building with intent to commit . . . 
theft." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (West 2004). The definitions 
applicable to the burglary statute provide that a "building," "in 
addition to its ordinary meaning, means any . . . trailer, 
sleeping car, or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight 
accommodation of persons . . . ." Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 
(West 2004) . 
The trial court looked to these statutorily-relevant 
definitions, not to the New Automobile Franchise Act, when it 
denied defendant's motion to quash the bindover because the State 
had charged felony burglary rather than misdemeanor burglary of a 
vehicle. That is, the trial court correctly recognized that for 
purposes of burglary and burglary of a vehicle, a camping trailer 
is clearly categorized as a "building" and so falls squarely 
within the burglary statute. 
Specifically, the trial court ruled that "the trailer would 
comply with a habitable dwelling, so it would qualify under the 
burglary statute" (R. 137: 5). In essence, the court recognized 
that the Code section governing both burglary and vehicle 
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burglary categorizes a camping trailer as, generally, a 
"building" and, more specifically, a "dwelling." 
A camping trailer is categorized as a "building" because, 
"in addition to its ordinary meaning," a building includes "any 
trailer . . . or other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight 
accommodations of persons."1 Utah Code Ann. §76-6-201 (1). A 
camping trailer may more specifically be categorized as a 
"dwelling," because it is a particular kind of "building," one 
that is "usually occupied by a person lodging therein at night, 
whether or not a person is actually present." Xd at (2).2 
The law is well settled that "[t]he plain language of a 
statute is to be read as a whole, and its provisions interpreted 
in harmony with other provisions in the same statute and Vith 
other statutes under the same and related chapters.'" Lyons v. 
Burton, 2000 UT 55, 1 17, 5 P. 3d 616 (quoting Roberts v. 
Erickson, 851 P.2d 643, 644 (Utah 1993) (citation omitted)); 
accord State v. Holm, 2006 UT 31, 1 22, 137 P.3d 726. Where the 
trial court categorized a camping trailer correctly as a 
building, it did not err in concluding that the State had 
properly charged defendant with burglary, rather than burglary of 
1
 Defendant conceded that the camping trailer "was equipped 
with a sleeping area" (R. 89, 137: 3). 
2
 Burglary of a building is a third degree felony, while 
burglary of a dwelling is a second degree felony. See Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-201(1). Despite the court's reference to a dwelling, 
defendant was convicted only of the lesser offense, burglary of a 
building. 
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a vehicle and, consequently, in denying defendant's motion to 
quash the bindover. 
Second, defendant's argument also fails because when a 
camping trailer is correctly categorized as a building within the 
meaning of the burglary statute, the Shondel doctrine does not 
apply. Under Shondel and its progeny, if two statutes proscribe 
precisely the same conduct but assess different penalties, the 
defendant is entitled to receive the lesser penalty and 
conviction. Shondel, 453 P.2d at 147-48; State v. Gomez, 722 
P.2d 747, 749 (Utah 1986); see also. State v. Bryan, 709 P.2d 
257, 263 (Utah 1985); State v. Kent, 945 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah App. 
1997); State v. Vogt, 824 P.2d 455, 457 (Utah App. 1991); State 
v. Duran, 772 P.2d 982, 987 (Utah App. 1989). 
The test for determining whether two statutes proscribe the 
same conduct is whether the "two statutes are wholly duplicative 
as to the elements of the crime." Bryan, 709 P.2d at 263; see 
also Kent, 945 P.2d at 147; Gomez, 722 P.2d at 749; Duran, 772 
P.2d at 987. If they are not, defendant may be sentenced for the 
crime carrying the greater penalty, "even if the defendant could 
have been charged with the crime carrying the less severe 
sentence, so long as there is a rational basis for the 
legislative classification." Kent, 945 P.2d at 147 (citations 
omitted). 
Here, the statutory requirements for burglary of a vehicle 
are not "wholly duplicative" of the elements of burglary. 
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Vehicle burglary requires a person to unlawfully enter a vehicle 
with intent to commit a felony or theft only. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-204. Burglary requires a person to enter or remain 
unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a felony or theft 
or to commit certain other specified crimes. Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-202. Without question, the State had to prove something 
different than the elements of vehicle burglary in order to 
establish that defendant committed burglary. That is, the State 
had to prove that the crime occurred in a ''trailer . . . or other 
vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-201(1). The locus of the crime thus distinguishes felony 
burglary from misdemeanor vehicle burglary. 
Moreover, a rational basis exists for the differing 
classifications of the two crimes. The law has always accorded 
the greatest privacy rights to one's home. Historically, a 
lesser expectation of privacy and autonomy has been accorded 
one's vehicle. A greater penalty for a home invasion and a 
lesser penalty for invasion of one's vehicle thus rationally 
relates to society's interest in according people a greater 
degree of protection in places where they stay overnight. 
Certainly, when a vehicle serves as a home, even if only 
temporarily, by accommodating overnight stays, then it makes good 
sense that the legislature would extend to such a vehicle the 
greater protection typically granted to homes. 
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Because the trial court properly characterized a camping 
trailer as a building within the meaning of the burglary statute 
and because the Shondel doctrine does not apply here, the trial 
court committed no error in sentencing defendant for a felony 
conviction for burglary. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's 
conviction on one count of burglary, a third degree felony. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this //^day of July, 2007. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK 
Assistant Attorney General 
^kv*M»u. 
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